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Civil No. 7967 
IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERA T. C.A.LLISTER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALFRED CYRIL CALLISTER., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
HoNORABLE JosEPH G. JEPPSON, Judge 
Vl· l 14 .... n r J.-t .3.-J v 
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~~i ·r\ v Gt1STIN, RICHARD·S & MATTSSON 
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IN THE S.UPREME COURT 
of the 
STJ\TE OF UTAH 
VERA T. CALLISTER, 
Plaintiff and A ppellOJYI)t, 
vs. 
ALFRED CYRIL CALLISTER, 
Defenda.nt and Respjondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIE·F 
Civil No. 
7967 
This app·eal. is taken from . a judgment entered on 
" December 31, 1952 modifying the interlocutory decree 
of divorce theretofore and on July 30, 1945 entered here-
in. The interlocutory decree was base·d upon a contract 
between the parties whereby Dr. Callister, the defendant, 
agreed to pay to plaintiff, his then wife, $400.00 per 
month during the life of plaintiff or until she remarries. 
Mrs. Callister has not remarried. The judgment appealed 
from reduces the amount .adjudged to plaintiff by the 
interlocutory decree from $400.00 to $250.00 p·er month. 
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STATEMEN·T OF' FACTS 
The grounds of divorce are set 'forth in paragraph 
3 of the F'indings of Fact ( Tr. 7, 8) by which it is found, 
among other things, that the defendant has transferred 
his affections from plaintiff to another woman, avowing 
his love for the other woman and that his future happi-
ness lies with her. The Doctor's affair of heart is fully 
outlined in a letter dated March 21, 1945 addressed to 
the plaintiff and introduced in evidence as Exhibit B. 
Consistent with that portion of the Doctor's letter 
to his wife that she need have no worry about financial 
security and that one-half of everything belongs to her, 
the agreement of July 28, 1945 attached to the Findings 
of Fact in connection with the interlocutory decree ('Tr. 
12-18) was entered into. Paragraph numbered "THIRD" 
the-reof reads as follows: 
"That the second party agrees to pay to first 
party alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month 
during the life of first party or until her re-Inar-
riage, and in addition thereto second party agrees 
to pay to first party $50.00 per month for the 
suppo-rt of the minor child; Vera Taft Callister, 
until said minor child becomes 18 years of agr. 
The alimony and support money payments herein 
mentioned shall be paid to first party on or before 
the 5th .day of each and every month beginning 
August 5, 1945." (Tr. 15). 
The inte:rlocutory decree, paragraph 5 (Tr. 21, 22) 
awards plaintiff judgment against the defendant ufor 
alimony" in the sum of $400.00 per month "during the 
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life of plaintiff ·or until her reinaiTiag-e,'' thus foll<nving 
the language of the agreement. The decree, 'vhile char-
acterizing the judg1nent as alimony, doe~ not contain 
the some,Yhat usual proYision Hor until the court otller-
wise orders" nor does the judgn1ent terininate upon the 
death of Dr. Callister. The decree expre8sly approves 
the agreement of July 28, 1945 and orders the sa1ne to 
be binding upon both parties. The agreement 1nakes 
provision in favor of plaintiff for insurance carried on 
the life of defendant and for present and prospective 
attorneys' fees and costs. With regard to the latter 
the agreement at paragraph numbered "S-EVENTH" 
provides: 
"~econd party hereby agrees to pay all attor-
neys' fees, costs, and expenses in any manner 
incurred by first party in the enforcement of this 
contract, or by reason of any controversy arising 
therefrom." (Tr. 16). 
By the agreement certain corporate stocks listed in 
Exhibit A attached thereto and of the then approximate 
value of $96,000.00 (Tr. 62) were divided equally between 
the parties and each received certain cash, . personal 
property and real estate. Defendant received, among 
other things, real p·roperty novvr known as the Callister 
Hospital Clinic at 559 East South Temple., S·alt Lake 
City, in which he subsequently invested $30,000.00' by 
way of cap~ital improvements, and presently carried on 
his books as a capital asset valued at $50,000.00 (Tr. 67). 
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Shortly after the divorce Dr. c·allister purchased 
a corner piece of property located at 23rd East and 
39th South from his mother for $1,350.00 (Tr. 69), upon 
which he has constructed a home for his present family 
consisting of his new 'vife and one child at a cost of 
another $30,000.00 ( Tr. 68). Since the divorce the de-
fendant has sold stocks of the approximate value of 
$19,500.00 ( Tr. 62, 116), retaining the securities listed 
in Exhibit C (Tr. 63). 
By reference to Exhibit E, the Pacific Coast Edition 
of the Vvall Street Journal for November 25, 1952 and 
received in evidence for the purpose of determining 
the then market value of such of the securities that 
are listed on Exhibit C as may be listed in the Journal 
(Tr. 64), the securities so listed have a market value 
of $50,512.50. By reference to Exhibit J, received in 
evidence to determine the value of Utah Oil Refining 
stock (Tr. 116, 117), the 33 shares of such stock held 
by defendant have a value of app-roximately $990.00. 
The 1,875 shares o:f Medical Arts stock held by the 
Doctor have a value of ~1.10 per share (Tr. 64) or a 
total of $2,062.50, and the Zions Benefit Building Society 
stock of which the Doctor has 144.86 shares (Tr. 65) 
valued at $50.00 per share (Tr. 102) amounts to $7,243.00. 
In all the D·octor at the time of the hearing on his peti-
tion for modification had stock and securities of a value 
of approximately $60,808.00, and real estate of the value 
of at least $60,000.00 with a mortgage indebtedness on 
the clinic property of $8,900.00 (Tr. 67). 
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The defendant had a total gross income for the 
year 1950 of $25,968.59 (Tr. 73), which did not include 
dividends in the amount of some $3,250.00 (Tr. 70). 
In 1950 the defendant had a total- income of some 
$:2:2,700.00 from personal service in connection with his 
profession and 'vhich did not include any income from 
his hospital venture (Tr. 84, 85). In 1951 he had a 
total income of some $40,400.00 which includes dividends 
in the amount of $3,200.00 and income from the hospital 
of $10,800.00, or an income from professional service~ 
in the amount of $26,400.00 (Tr. 85, 86). F·or the first 
six ~onths of the. year 1952 the Doctor's gross collec-
tions were $14,8~0.00 (Tr. 91). In 1944 the Doctor had 
a net income from his professional practice of $12,686.91 
(Tr. 92). He persists in operating the hospital clinic 
at a loss. 
Plaintiff, after the interlocutory decree, sold some 
$45,000.00 of her securities (Tro 12·2) and invested in 
real property. She now o\vns the Nira Ap·artments in 
Salt Lake City which she purchased for $55,000.00 and 
on which she owes $21,340.00 payable at the rate of 
$279.84 per month, and upon which she has made capital 
improvements in the sum of $16,000.00. She has also 
purchased a parking lot for $13,500.00 upon which .she 
owes $8,432.62 (Tr. 124); a vacant lot on 21st East and 
13th South for which she paid $6,800.00 (Tr. 125) and a 
vacant lot on South State Street for which she paid 
$5,250.00 which is being sold under a contract of sale 
for $9,500.00 ( Tr. 124, 125). Werner Kiepe, called as a 
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witness for Dr. Callister, testified that the Nira Apart-
ments had a present market value of $75,000.00 (Tr. 78, 
79); the parking lot $14,000.00 and the South 21st East 
property $10,000.00 ( Tr. 79, 80). Mrs. Callister retains 
five types of sec uri ties which she has held since the 
divorce (Tr. 123). Computing the value of these securi-
ties by reference to the Exhibits E and F we find that 
the present value of the same is $18,581.25. Mrs. Cal-
lister's net rental income for the year 1951, as shown 
by Exhibit 2, was $4,255.85; for 1950, as shown by 
Exhibit 1, the rental income was $4,568.45; the only 
income shown by the record as going to Mrs. Callister 
except for the so-called alimony payments. 
The property settlement agre~ment recites the mar-
riage of the parties on July 13, 191'6; that five children 
have been born as the issue of the marriage, and Dr. 
Callister testified that he is presently of the age of 58 
years ( Tr. 54). The findings of the trial court on the 
motion to modify (Tr. 151) are to the effect that the 
Doctor's income from his practice has decreased from 
$1000.00 to $600.00 per month; that heart trouble con-
sistent with coronary artery disease, progressive in its 
nature, requires the Do'ctor to abstain from activities 
producing physical and mental strain, thereby reducing 
his ability to earn income from his profession; that since 
the original decree the Doctor has been required to sell 
many of the stocks distributed to him in the property set-
tlement fo-r the purpose of providing facilities and equip-
ment for carrying on his practice and profession and 
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the entry of the interlocutory decree the Doctor has 
remarried and has a child of the age of 4 years depending 
upon him for support and maintenance. 
After finding that the plaintiff, the appellant herein, 
has a net rental income in excess of $4,500.00 per year 
with income from interest and investments in stocks it 
is concluded that the original decree should be amended 
as aforesaid, and that each party should pay his or her 
own costs in connection with the proceeding. The Court 
specifically finds th·at the plaintiff has adequate income 
from which to pay her own costs and attorneys' fees 
in defending the attack made upon the decree and 
• property settlement agreement. 
STATEMEN·T OF POINT·S 
This appeal challenges the findings of the trial court, 
its conclusions of law an:d its decree of modifiea.tion, 
each and every part thereof bemg contrary to the evi-
dence and to law and in connection therewith we assert 
the following: 
1. The division of p-roperty, both p.resent and 
prospective, was by contract confirmed by the interloc-
utory decree without consideration of the needs. of the 
wife or the ability of the husband to continue to pay 
and, therefore, not subject to modification. 
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2. The so-ealled alimony provision is not subject 
to modification but only to termination as in the property 
settlement agreement expressly provided and "\vhich con-
ditions have not occurred. 
3. The Doct9r husband cannot indulge himself the 
luxury of a costly home for his new family and a clinic, 
which he persists in operating at a loss, and thus claim 
impoverishment to the extent that he cannot respond 
to his contractual commitment and the decree of the 
court confirming the same .. 
4. No change of fin·ancial circumstance not volun-
tarily assumed by defendant is shown by the record 
warranting a decrease in the monthly payment to the 
plaintiff, nor is there any health consideration that 
merits such change. 
5. The present incom,e of the pl'aintiff is the nor1nal 
consequence of prudent investment from capital assets 
received by virtue of the interlocutory de-cree of divorce 
and pToperty settlement agreement. 
6. The plaintiff should be awarded attorneys' fees 
and costs in the defense of defendant's motion. 
The foregoing arise on the face of the record without 
an:r conflict in the evidence. There is no burden upon 
the appeltant to show that the findings of the trial court 
are manifestly or clearly against the weight of the 
evidence as there is no substantial or any conflict with 
respect thereto. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE MONTHLY PAYMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
MODIFICATION. 
The rule that 've are contending for here is set out 
in the case of Dickey v. Dickey, 141 A. 387, 58 A.L-.R. 
634 (Md.), which holds that if the allowance to the wife 
in the decree is the result of a p~revious agreement 
'between the spouses and does not fall within the accepted 
definition of alimony, so that it would have been impos-
sible for the chancellor to have allowed permanent 
alimony as the decree provides, then, notwi'thstanding 
tllat even the parties and the court called it "alimony,", 
the allowance for the wife in the de;cree was not alimony 
and a court of equity has no power to modify the. decree' 
as in the case of an award of alimony. The c·ourt points 
out that the agreement by the husbiand to p~ay the wife 
a weekly sum of money until her death or remarriage 
did not limit his payment to the joint lives of the 
spouses, and hence was not what the court could have 
decreed as alimony. 
In the instant ease we have the same situation as 
, in the Dickey case, that is, that the agreement provides 
the wife with a periodic payment without reference to 
whe1her or not the husband survive'd her and where 
the monthly payment is referred to as "alimony." The 
Court in Dickey v. Dickey, supra, rejeeted as surplusage 
and as ill-advised the clause "or until the further order 
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of this court," thus bringing the decree in conformity 
with the agreement of the parties and giving to the 
decree its true import and intended effect by recognizing 
it as having been founded on contract. So, in the instant 
case, the term "alimony" as us~d both in the contract 
and interlocutory decree should not cause the Court 
to lose sight of th·e. contract itself. 
The Doctor and his wife had been married for 29 
years. The divorce came at the threshhold of the Doctor's 
career. By his letter, Exhibit B, he stated his intent to 
assure the plaintiff financial security and freedom from 
financial worry. The property settlement agreement 
ap'proved by the Court as being just, fair and reason-
a:ble effectively binds the defendant to the payment of 
0400.00 per month during the life of plaintiff or until 
her remarriage. The. parties by contract divided their 
accumulated property and assets "of actual and con-
tingent value" and has the effect of allocating to the 
wife the· monthly payment aforesaid out of the estate 
of the defendant irrespective of his futu!e earnings. 
The monthly payment to the plaintiff was but a part of 
a well conceived and carefully prepared contract to • 
effectuate a just, fair and reasonable division o~ proper-
ty. It was not contemplated by the parties that either 
of them could change or modify the provisions thereof 
nor did the interlocutory decree so provide. It is difficult 
to conceive of a more comprehensive statement of pur-
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pose and intent. It is difficult to understand hoiW the 
trial court could have been so unmindful of the integrity 
of con tract. 
In North v. North, 100 S.W. 2d 582, 109 A.L.R. 
1061 (Mo.), the lower court modified a divorce decree as 
to the allowance made to the wife which the divorce 
decree denominates "alin1ony." In the original deeree 
a judgment was entere'd in favor of the wife against the 
husband for the payment of alimony at the rate of 
$500.00 per month so· long as she remains single and 
unmarried. Some seven years after the decree the de-
fendant filed a motion asking that the divorce· decree 
be modified as to the amount of alimony on the alleged 
ground that the changed financial condition of the de-
fendant warranted such acti'on. After a hearing the 
lower court sustained defendant's motion and reduced 
the allowance made to plaintiff in the decree from $500.00 
to $300.00 per month. Plaintiff appealed. Defendant 
died pending the appeal and the cause was revived in 
the 'name of the executrix of the defendant's estate. 
The Missouri S·upreme Court reversed the order of 
the trial court modifying the decree, holding (1) a 
husband and wife in contemplation of a se·paration and 
divorce may, by valid contract between them, settle and 
adjust all p~roperty rights growing out of the marital 
relation, including the wife's right of dower and claim 
for alimony, support and maintenance; (2) postnuptial 
contracts of separation are not unlawful, and such. con-
tracts when lawfully made, are sufficient to bar alimony 
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and dower; (3) the statute which authorizes the court 
to modify an award of alimony does not authorize the 
modification of legal contractual obligation whlch the 
husband assumes and agrees to pay his wife; (4) the 
parties had a lawful right to settle all their property 
rights by contraet between themselves which they did 
do; ( 5) the con tract is supported by a valid considera-
tion; (6) the legal duty of the husband to support his 
wife when she liv~d with him, and his duty to provide 
support and maintenance for her in case of a separation 
and divorce furnished a sufficient consideration for the 
contract; (7) as an additional consideration for the con-
tract of settlement the wife agreed to release her dower 
right in the husband's property. 
We point to the similarity of the contract in the 
instant case with the. principles announced by the court 
in the N ort:h case, even to the recital that the parties 
are desirous of settling any and all differences and 
claims with reference to division of property, alimony, 
support money, attorneys' fees and court costs, and to 
paragraph numbered "SIXTH" which reads as follows: 
"This agreement and conveyance is mutually 
intended to be, and the same is here'by expressly 
made and intended by each of the parties hereto 
as a mutual release, relinquish1nent and convey-
ance of all the right, title and interest that n1ay 
now be or shall hereafter be, during the life.t~inl c 
or at the death of either of the parties hereto, 
acquired by the other by virtue of said marriage 
that now subsists between the parties hereto 
under the laws of the State of Utah, in and to 
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all of the p·roperty, both personal and real, of the 
other party, except to the extent of the moneys to 
be paid by the second party to the first party as 
alimony and support money; and it is the inten-
tion of the parties hereto to 1nutually rele'a:se and 
waive all provisions of the laws of the S:tate of 
Utah relating to husband and wife as to dower 
or the interests of the wife in the .real property, 
homestead rights, etc., and forever b.a'r each other 
respectively from rights of succession or inherit-
ance by reason of the rnarriage relation existing 
between them." (Italics ours). 
In North v. North the Dickey case was quoted from 
at length and the court held the provision in the decree 
awarding the wife $500.00 per month to continue so long 
as she remains single and unmarried (the same as that 
provided in the contract between the parties) justifies 
the conclusions that the decree was an approval of the · 
contract, and not an award of alimony, be-cause the . 
court had no authority to make an award of a.pmony 
to continue so long as the wife remains single and un-
married but did have authority to approve a contract 
between the parties containing that provision, and con-
cluded: 
"Our conclusio·n in the instant case is that 
the allowance made to the wife in the decree was, 
in effect, an app.roval of the contractual obli-
gation of the husband to the wife, and not an 
award of alimony, and for that reason is no:t 
subject to modification. A modification of the 
decree would amount to a modification of the 
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contract itself, which is not subject to revocation 
or modification ·except by consent of the parties 
thereto." 
The authorities cited above go to the marrow of con-
tract law and treat as ill-advised and misleading those 
decisions that say without explanation that an agreement 
between husband and wife settling their p-rop·erty rights 
is not binding on the courts in a divorce action. Where 
such contracts are free from fraud, eollusion, or com-
pulsion, and are. fair to the wife, the courts have no 
right to disregard them. 
In Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 44 P. 2d 540 (Cal.), the 
court held-: (1) that the parties may contract with regard 
to their properties and their respective interests therein; 
and (2) though not binding in the first instance on the 
court in which the divorce action is pending such con-
tract may be approved and confirmed by the court and 
if ap·propriately referred to and adopted in its decree, 
such decree, as to matters covered by the agreement, 
be.comes immune from subsequent modification. In 
Puckett v. Puckett, 136 P. 2d 1 (-C'al.), the property 
settlement agreement was approved by the court and 
payments ordered by the decree to be paid pursuant to 
the agreement, thus making the decree· irmnune from 
modification except by the consent of the parties. The 
court held that the periodic payments were not aliinony; 
they were a part of a property settlement. The court 
stated that the agreement there under consideration 
leadls to the conclusion that the monthly payments 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
ordered were an inseparable part of a property settle-
ment agreement and therefore they may not be modified. 
This 'vas on the theory that the monthly payments 
ordered by the decree were in effect and essence, a phase 
of the property settlement rather than mere alimony. 
In Rich v. Rich, 112 P. 2d 780 (Cal.), the property 
settlement agreement referred to monthly installments 
as ''alimony." The decree likewise referred to the pay-
ments as "alimony." The payments were required bo:th 
by the agreement and the decree to continue even though 
plaintiff remarries. The plaintiff remarried after the 
divorce and the appellant moved to modify the decree 
by eliminating therefrom all payments accruing after 
the remarriage of his former wife. The court below 
denied the motion and on appeal the order was affirmed. 
The Court stated: 
"Appellant's contention cannot be sustained. 
The payment of $2,400.00 to respondent was an 
integral part of the property settlement agree-
ment, and the fact that it was stated to: be 
'alimony for her support and maintenance,' and 
was to be paid in monthly installments instead 
of in a lump sum, does not alter the fact that 
the payments were made pursuant to the agree-
ment ap~proved and adopted by the court in the 
interlocutory decree, and not merely as alimony 
awarded by the court. A careful reading of the 
agreement indicates clearly that it was the inten-
tion of the parties to definitely, fully and per-
manently adjust all of their property rights, and 
the title to the paragraph providing for the pay-
ment of the $2,400.00, 'Payment of Money t~ 
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First Party by Second Party,' clearly shows it 
to be an integral part of the agreement. The 
further clause that 'said (monthly) paYJ.nent.s to 
continue· even in the event of remarriage' indi-
cates also that it was the intention of the parties 
that respondent should receive the full $2,400.00. 
·To sustain appellant's contention would in our 
opinion de:prj_ve respondent of what may well 
have been an important part of the consideration 
which induced her to execute the ag~eement. The 
property settlement agreement having been ap-
proved by the court and incorporated in the 
interlocutory decree, is now binding upon the 
p-arties, and cannot now he avoided." 
A recent expression from the California Court is 
found in Tuttle v. Tuttle, 240 P. 2d 587. In that case 
the situation was turned around. The wife attempted 
to increase the amount specified in the decree for her 
support and maintenance upon the ground of a change 
of circumS'tances justifying an increase in the amounts 
payable to her. The husband alleged that the provisions 
of the decree for the payment of the stated amounts 
was not an award of alimony but an integral part of a 
property settlement agreement independent of the 
divorce decree·. The decree was silent as to the property 
settlement agreement. The Court, after a review of 
previous California decisions, held: ( 1) the trial court 
has jurisdiction to determine whether the decree was 
based upon a property settlement agreement with pay-
ments provided as a phase of property adjustment and 
therefore not subject to Inodification; and (2) there \Vas 
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ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that 
the provision for payments to the wife was a disposition 
of property rights and not alimony. 
So far as we are able to determine this Court has 
not heretofore passed upon this precise question. In 
Murphy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 P. 1010, there was no 
contract involved and the divorced husband wa:s de-
ceased. The Court held that minor children were entitled 
to be supported out of the estate of the deeedent pur-
suant to the divorce decree providing for support. While 
the question of following the claim for alimony into the 
estate of the deceased husband was apparently not 
before the Court, the Court, nevertheleS'~, stated: 
"In such case, whether or not the divorced 
wife and minor children, or any of them, are 
entitled to have the payment of alimony or money 
for their support continue after the death of the 
deceased, depends upon the nature and terms of 
the decree allowing same." 
In Buzzo v. Buzzo, 45 Utah 62.5, 148 P. 362, it was 
eontended that the award of $40.00 per month as alimony 
was fixed by the consent of the parties (apparently an 
understanding). ~he Court held that every decree of 
divorce and alimony must be deemed to have been 
entered subject to the provisions of Section 1212, c·om-
piled Laws, 1907 (Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953). This typ.e 
of situation is analyzed and distinguished in the Dickey 
v. Dickey and North v. North cases, supra. In Barra-
clough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 111 P. 2d 792, the. 
order denying a motion to modify the · decree was 
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affirmed. The appellant contended that the trial court 
was in error in ruling that a stipulation fixing alimony 
payments was a complete and final settlement so as to 
p-reclude the Court from modifying the order based on 
such stipulation. The Court did not pass on the proposi-
tion as to whether there was an agreement for a com-
plete settlement of all property rights, holding that the 
agreement was just what it said it was, to-wit: a "stipu-
lation" as to what the Court was willing to award her 
as alimony and therefore that the trial court erred in 
determining that the agreement constituted a complete 
and final settlement between the parties, and on other 
grounds held that the trial court properly denied the 
motion to modify. The Court, however, recognized the 
rule that we are contending for here by the following 
statement: 
' ' 
"The general· rule in many jurisdictions is 
that where the parties enter into an agreement 
for a complete settlement of all property rights 
in case a divorce is granted, which agreement is 
approved by the court, neither party can there-
after come into court to have the agreement Inodi-
fied. For cases holding to this effect, as well as 
contra, see annotations in 58 A.L.R. 639 and 109 
A.L.R. 1068. However, the law with respect to 
property settlements not being applicable to 
situations where alimony is involved, we need not 
enter into a discussion of the above ru1e, sin('c 
we conclude that the 'stipulation' the substance 
of which was incorporated by the court in its 
decree, was not a property settleu1ent but an 
agreement as to what ~alimony' the court 1night 
award appellant in case a divorce \\!~as granted." 
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In Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P. 2d 222, the 
Court held that it could no longer be considered as an 
open question in this State but that the Court has juris-
diction to modify the provisions of the alimony decree 
which was originally based upon a stipulation of the 
parties. We submit that in the instant ease a sole-mn 
agreement of the parties adjusting between themselves 
all of their property rights, including the rights of the 
wife to so-called alimony, cannot later be repudiated by 
either party as to payments denominated alimony or as 
to any other feature of the contract, particularly when 
the contract has received the ap·proval of the Court as 
such. Again we point to the reasoning of the Dickey 
and No-rth cases and to the provision that Mrs. c·allister 
was to receive the monthly payment so long as she lives 
or until she remarries, strengthened. perhaps by the: 
provision for attorne-ys' fees and costs in favor of Mrs. 
Callister and against the Doctor in any manner ineurre-d 
"in the enforcement of this contract, or by reason of 
any controversy arising therefrom," and also to the 
express provision that it is the intention of the parties 
"to mutually release and waive all provisions of the 
laws of the State of Utah relating to husband and wife. 
as to dower or the interests of the wife in the real 
property, homestead rights, etc., and forever bar each 
other respectively from rights of succession or inherit-
ance by reason of the marriage relation existing between 
them." 
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There are certain tax implications involved in the 
use of the term "alimony" but those implications and 
the benefit that the Doctor derives from the payment of 
the money as "alimony" should not preclude the c·ourt 
to look upon the pre·sent contract as being subject to 
change or modification except by the consent of the 
parties. It is obvious from the contract itself that the 
parties intended their rights to be contractual and not 
the subject of modification. An added consideration for 
the rights in favor of Mrs. C·aJ.lister was her immediate 
relinquishment of dower interests and the rights of 
inheritance. 
II. 
VOLUNTARY IMPOVERISHMENT IS NOT A GROUND 
FOR MODIFICATION. 
Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216, 198 P. 2d 233, in-
volved a situation where a husband, capable of earning 
a steady wage sufficient according to the trial court to 
entitle his wife to $250.00 a month alimony, gave up his 
employment and entered into a business arrangement 
whereby he received his keep and $1.00 a day as a fry 
cook, with the hope of obtaining an interest in the busi-
ness, if it proved successful. The Court held that by his 
self-impoverishment the husband could not avoid his 
responsibilit;r to his former wife. 
In the Osmus ca.se the Court said: 
"Nor does a 1nan have a right to sarrifice 
the present needs and welfare of his fa1nily, and 
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particularly of his infant children, to the end 
that at some indefinite future time he may better 
his own financial status. His first duty is to pro-
vide for those whom he is legally and morally 
obligated to support, and if it becomes necessary 
for him to forego business opportunities with 
bright future prospects but with no present real-
ization, in order to perform his obligations, the 
la-,v-, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, 
'vill require him so to do. From all the evidence 
and all the fair inferences therefrom, the court 
could reasonably find that defendant entered into 
his business relationship as much for the purpose 
of depriving his wife of the alimony and support 
money to which she was lawfully entitled, as for 
the purpose of bettering his future from a finan-
cial point of view. But if the defendant be given 
the benefit of all doubts, and his explanation that 
he expected eventually to receive profits from 
the business which would considerably exceed 
what he would earn as wages, he accepted as true, 
defendant's legal position w9uld not be improved. 
He has neither the right nor the privilege, to 
ignore, for a protracted period of time, his legal 
o:bligations to his family for the selfish purpose 
of advancing his own financial benefit." 
Dr. C·allister in Exhibit G, his 1951 State Income 
Tax Return (under Schedule B-7), takes a deduction 
of $27,525.93 for wages, bonuses and salaries paid. He 
then takes (under Schedule B-12) depreciation of 
$4,529.60, which depreciation is taken on the clinic at 
559 East South Temple (under Schedule H of Exhibit 
G). The total of the Doctor's 1951 business expense plus 
claimed depreciation for that year is $32·,055.53. In 
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1944 the Doctor's gross professional income was 
$26,069.08, at which time he was not operating a clinic. 
In 1944 the Doctor had a net income from his p.ractice of 
$12,686.91 (Tr. 92): · 
In 1951 according to Exhibit G the Doctor had a 
gross income of $40,484.57 of which $26,421.46 was from 
his practice and $10,800.00 from his hospital a~d 
$3,243.11 from dividends ( Tr. 85, 86). In 1951 the Doctor 
ends up with a net taxable income of $6,699.64. His 
gross professional income in 1951 was $352.38 more 
than his gross professional income in 1944, in which 
year he had a net income from his practice of $12,686.91. 
The Doctor is on the Staff of the L.D.S. Hospital yet 
he claims it is neeessary to maintain his own clinic (Tr. 
93). At the time of the hearing on the motion to modify 
the -clinic was not open ( Tr. 95). The clinic was formed 
not. so much to help out the Dnctor financially but as a 
help to his patients and upon which he is taking a 
financial loss (Tr. 108). The Doctor is a self-styled 
idealist and maintains the clinic for the convenience of 
himself and to assist his clients (Tr. 109). 
The Doctor's claimed loss of income 1s direetly 
attributable to the luxury of a clinic that he persists in 
maintaining. The record shows that his professional 
earnings from personal services . have not decreased 
since the entering of the interlocutory decree. On the 
other hand the Doctor has capital assets of more than 
$110,000.00 which include a new ho1ne valued hy the 
witness Solomon at $37,800.00 (Tr. 120). The predicn-
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ment that the Doctor now finds himself in, if it can be 
called such, is of his own choosing and this is not suffi-
eient ground for n1odification. The expression of the 
Court in Osmus Y. Osm.us, supra, seems peculiarly appro-
priate. 
Dr. Callister has used a tax concept in determining 
his income available for payment of his obligation under 
the divorce decree. In stating his 1951 net income he 
has referred to income after depreciation taken of 
$4,529.60 (Exhibit H, Tr. 51-52). In arriving at his 
income for 1950 he has further deducted a $2,350.00 
capital loss (Tr. 100). Neither of the-se ite-ms affected 
the Doctor's cash position, but were bookkeeping entries 
only. In Heuchan v. Heuch{JJ'fb, 228 P. 2d 470 (Wash.), 
the c·ourt considered an accounting problem identical 
with that before us here, and it held that a tax concept 
of accounting should not he used in determin!ng ability 
to comply with a divorce decree. The Washington Court 
used the following language: 
"No doubt the Heuchans are entitled to the 
claimed deduction of $99.9'6 a month for depTe-
ciation when computing their taxable income, but 
we are not limited to their taxable income in 
determining appellant's ability to make alimony 
payments. It is conceded that this $99.96 is not 
paid into any fund for depreciation but is merely 
a bookkeeping entry; it is available to and is used 
by the Heuchans for their own purposes. The 
trial court was fully justified in taking that fact 
into consideration when determining the amount 
which appellant is able to pay respondent as 
· alim.ony.~' 
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The trial court found that the Doctor had been 
required to sell many stocks for the purpose of continu-
ing his practice and for providing a home for his family. 
As to the necessity for such sales and what effect such 
sales should have in this matter, the record speaks for 
itself. The Doctor testified that three sales of stocks 
were made since 1945. He sold Union Pacific stock for 
$10,800.00 in about 1947 (Tr. 62), when he was construct-
ing his new home and his clinic (Tr. 67-68). He sold 
various stocks in 1950 for $8,346.70 and paid the proceeds· 
on the mortgage on his clinic ( Tr. 66). He sold all of 
his Mono-Kearsarge Mining stock for $528.49 in June 
1950, and this money was applied on the clinic mortgage 
(Tr. 1·16). All three sales of stocks were conversions 
into other assets at the Doctor's choosing. No sales were 
:. nade after June, 1950 ( Tr. 7 4). 
The trial court found that the Doctor remarried 
and now has a minor child four years of age dependent 
on him. No other m.oral conclusion can ,be drawn from 
the Doctor's letter of March 21, 1945 (Exhibit B) than 
that the Doctor contemplated remarriage as soon as pos-
sible. ·The letter was before the trial court in 1945 when 
~n·ovisions of the property settlement agreement were 
approved with the sure anticipation that in giving hiu1 
his freedom the Doctor would acquire a new fa1nily and 
new responsibilities. 
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III. 
THERE IS NO HEALTH CONSIDERATION THAT 
MERITS ANY CHANGE. 
The letter written by the Doctor to Mrs. C,allister 
on March 21, 1945 portrays the Doctor lying in bed 
''fighting with this problem and_ having anginal pain," 
and "fervently wishing that ~ final coronary attack 
would come and solve the problem" for him. The Doctor 
testified that his written exp-ressions we-re interp·retative 
of the actual pain that he was suffering, medically speak-
ing, prior to the divorce. The pain was real and not 
imaginary and thought by the Doctor to be extremely 
significant (Tr. 56, 57). Dr. Viko, testifying for the 
defendant, stated that Dr. Callister specializes in sur-
gery and that the witness as the examining physician 
did not suggest that his patient retard his work as a 
surgeon, nor did he advise him to retire from pTactice 
(Tr. 41, 42). The witness' findings would indicate the 
same type of heart disease in his present examination 
of Dr. Callister as that described by Dr. Callister in 
March, 1945 (Tr. 42). Dr. C:allister was advised to 
reduce the use of tobacco and to refr~ain from such things 
as political campaigns (Tr. 41) and to adhere to a diet 
due to over-weight ('Tr. 40). Dr. Callister testified that 
he did not think that over the period of the last 7 years 
he had lost any of his skill or deteriorated a.t all in his 
ability to p·erform services as a surgeon and doctor 
in this community (Tr. 97). The claimed physical im-
pairment is dissipated by the record and, in any event, 
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the Doctor entered into the contract with his wife with 
full knowledge of the heart condition. There is nothing 
in the record to show a loss of earnings on account of 
any claimed physical condition. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S INCOME IS THE RESULT OF PRUDENT 
MANAGEMENT OF CAPITAL ASSETS RECEIVED AT THE 
TIME OF THE DIVORCE. 
· · Dr. C'allister, after selling $19,500.00 worth of secur-
ities, had dividends in 1951 from the remainder of 
$3,243.11. Mrs. Callister's dividend record by way of 
her tax returns was excluded by the trial court (Tr. 
130, 131) so the only eVidence as to her income other 
than the payments from the Doctor is reflected by 
Exhibits 1 and 2. By Exhibit 2 Mrs. Callister's net 
return from rentals for the year 1951 was $4,255.85 but 
against this she is paying $279.84 per month on the 
indebtedness against the Nira Apartments. She is also 
required to pay income tax on the $4,800.00 paid to her 
each year by the ·Doctor. The comparison of income 
investment between the Doctor and Mrs. Callister pre-
dominates on the side of the D·octor. It is Mrs-. Callister 
that could claim, in the absence of the contract, a 
change of circumstances calling for an increase in the 
payments to her. Mrs. Callister has maintained the 
family unit since her husband abandoned her for another 
woman. The comparisons that the Doctor now atte1npts 
to make are odious. We doubt if this Court will place 
a premium upon frugality and co1npetent manage1nent 
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of one's own affairs. Mrs. Callister has not realized 
upon the claimed enhancement in values of her proper-
ties and the assertion by the Doctor in that regard 
should be ignored. What Mrs. Callister has by way of 
income is the normal consequence of prudent investment 
from the capital assets received by her through the 
property settlement agreement and the interlocutory 
decree of divorce approving the same. 
v. 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTOR-
NEYS' FEES AND COSTS. 
The property settlement agreement was introduced 
in evidence as Exhibit A on the modification p,roceedings 
(Tr. 55, 56). The last paragraph thereof contains an 
express provision for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses 
in any manner incurred by plaintiff in the enforcement 
of the contract or by reason of any controversy arising 
therefrom. This should he sufficient answer to the pro-
position. The trial court, however, found that Mrs. Cal-
lister had sufficient. funds with which to pay her own 
attorneys' fees and costs and therefore awarded none. 
We submit that even in the absence of a contract Mrs. 
c·allister should he entitled to attorneys' fees in resisting 
the action of her former husband. To this effect is Stuber 
v. Stuber, ______ Utah ...... , 244 P. 2d 650, and the cases 
therein cited, and also Lerner v. Superior Court, 242 P. 
2d 321 (Cal.). 
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CONCLUSION 
As was said in Osmus v. Osmu.s, supra, "Courts are 
not to be trifled with by litigants." In that case attention 
is called to divorce cases, which, although not ordinarily 
involving problems of great legal magnitude, quite fre-
quently involve social problems of the utmost delicacy 
and importance-problems of such nature that the state, 
as well at the litigants, has an interest in their solution. 
"A freedom-seeking spouse may not, in his 
eagerness to he speedily released from his Inatri-
, monial bonds, make rash and reckless agreements 
and promises, upon which the court 1nay rely in 
fixing the amount of alimony, and then return 
a few months later and complain that the award 
for alimony is excessive or unfair. Such is appar-
ently what was attempted in this case." 
Of equal importance is the sanctity of contract-
the premise of man's relationship to man under our form 
of economy. Property settlements in divorce actions by 
way of contract approved by the court should be treated 
no .differently than any other contract where the con-
tracting parties have come to an agreement fairly and 
without fraud, collusion or overreaching. The monthly 
payment to the wife, an integral part of the contract, 
should be treated as such no matter what it is called 
and should not be confused with the situation involving 
necessity or need on the one hand and the ability to pay 
on the other-the type of situation ordinarily found in 
the absence of contract. 
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The rule we are contending for is not without its 
logical and reasonable exceptions. As poin'ted out in 
the separate concurring opinion in Dickey v. Dickey, 
supra, any decree for performance under future as well 
as under present conditions is subject to modifica~tion 
to adapt it to the future conditions. 
"Conditions will change and sometimes ren-
der enforcement impracticable; the court will not 
insist upon an impractical performance, of course, 
but \vill act according to conditions as they ·may 
be, and thus, whether we avow it or not, the 
decree will be modified or suspended; and it seems 
to me this limitation should he recognized in the 
rule." · 
But here we have a man who is more than moder-
ately wealthy, with more than the normal earning capacity 
·and where his earnings have actually increased rather 
than decreased since the time of the divorce. It is not 
impractical for him to p·erform nor is there any other 
conceivable consideration which, as to him, should cause 
the intervention of equity. The words· used in the con-
tract and in the . decree to the effect that Mrs. Callister 
will he paid $400.00 p:er month as long as she lives or 
until she remarried were carefully expressed, judiciously 
weighed and were written in the light of the circum-
stances and conditions as they then and now exist. 
There is no change in the Doctor's circumstances 
that warrants a modification even in the absence of the 
contract, but we trust that in so holding the Court will 
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not avoid settling for this jurisdiction the contractual 
and binding nature of a comprehensive and approved 
property settlement and alimony agreement. 
It is prayed that the judgment appealed from be 
reversed and the cause remanded to the lower court to 
reinstate the monthly payments in the full sum of $400.00 
per month as of January 5, 1953, coupled also with an 
order for the lower court to determine the amount of 
attorneys' fees that the Doctor should be required to pay 
to the plaintiff for the use and benefit of her attorneys in 
defending the attack upon the decree both in the trial 
court and in this ~c:ourt by reason of the contract and the 
proprie'ty of the situation, with an award in the plain-
tiff's favor for her costs herein incurred. -
R.espectfully submitted, 
JAMES w. BELESS, JR. AND 
GUSTIN, RICHARD·S & MATTS·SON 
By JAMES W. BELESS, JR. 
HARLEY W. GUSTIN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
arnd Appellant 
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